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The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) signed in October 2008 between the
Caribbean and the European Union has been the subject of much controversy.
There has been a marked split within the Caribbean between the officials and
politicians who negotiated — and thus championed — the EPA and the wider
academic and civil society community that subjected it to heavy criticism. The
paper examines these debates in detail and situates them within the broader
intellectual and practical panorama of Caribbean development alternatives.
Specifically, it discusses how the terrain upon which development has been both
theorised and practised in the region has narrowed significantly since the 1980s,
with the EPA being the latest manifestation of this evolving trend. The paper
consequently goes beyond an analysis of the short-term politics of the EPA to
elucidate the deeper, structural explanations for the divisions over the EPA between
the policy and academic communities and the wider implications of the Agreement
for contemporary Caribbean development.
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Introduction
For the last decade or so the external relations of the predominantly English-
speaking Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have been dominated by the
prospective reordering of the region’s longstanding trade arrangements
with the European Union (EU), with the main aim being to establish an
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). The foundations of the EPA were
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laid by the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which set out a time-frame for the
establishment of reciprocal free trade agreements to replace preferences
established by the 1975 Lome´ Convention, which was subject to adverse rulings
under both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) during the 1990s and 2000s. For
the Caribbean, this process culminated in October 2008 when, under the
auspices of the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific states
(CARIFORUM), the region became the first — and, at the time of writing, the
only— region to sign a comprehensive EPA with the EU.1 Although viewed in
certain policy-making circles as demonstrative of a new political and economic
maturity on the part of CARICOM, the decision to sign a comprehensive EPA
has in fact proven to be highly controversial.
Outside the region, the decision has been criticised because, in signing
a comprehensive EPA, CARIFORUM effectively broke ranks with the rest
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group, which had thus far resisted
much of the EU’s post-Cotonou trade agenda. In fact, with the exception
of CARIFORUM, the furthest that any ACP countries have gone is to sign
‘goods only’ interim agreements, which constitute the bare legal minimum
required to satisfy multilateral trade rules. Inside the region, the decision has
also been the subject of intense criticism, mostly deriving from a disparate
group of academics, former government officials, opposition politicians and
prominent members of civil society. This internal critique has focused on two
different aspects of the EPA (Girvan 2009a). First, questions have been raised
about the substantive merits of the agreement which, it is claimed, offers
few discernible development benefits while at the same time threatening to
derail the region’s own integration effort and reduce the strategic options open
to the Caribbean in other bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations
(Brewster 2003; Girvan 2006a; Lewis 2007; Payne 2008; Bishop and Payne
2010). Second, CARIFORUM — and particularly the Caribbean Regional
Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which led the EPA negotiations on behalf of
CARIFORUM — has been taken to task for the allegedly highly technocratic
way in which the EPA negotiations were handled and for the failure to address
numerous public concerns expressed about the agreement and the means by
which it was concluded. As one leading regional commentator, Ronald Sanders
(2010) has put it, ‘in the end, trade negotiators were blamed for an EPA that
few liked and even fewer, including in many governments, understood’.
In this paper, we provide a broad assessment of these and other criticisms
levelled against the CARIFORUM–EU EPA. It should be noted that,
although not yet complete, the EPA process has already generated a great
deal of comment and debate, the majority of which has focused on the
technical merits and demerits of the agreement (e.g. Bernal 2008; Humphrey
2008; Meyn et al. 2009; Stevens 2008, 2009; ECLAC 2009). We do not seek to
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replicate these arguments, but instead aim to gauge the wider significance of
the politics of this EPA. Put another way, we are interested in what the
CARIFORUM EPA tells us about the region’s current and future develop-
ment options. The central thrust of the case that has been advanced by
Caribbean elites and other advocates of the EPA is that, while the final
agreement was far from perfect, the CRNM nevertheless managed to extract
important concessions from the EU through careful and informed negotiation.
Under these circumstances, it is argued that, overall, the agreement represented
the best possible deal that could have been obtained. This justification raises
a series of important analytical questions that we proceed to discuss. How far
indeed did the CARIFORUM agreement constitute the best deal that could be
reached under the circumstances? Has the subsequent criticism levelled at the
CRNM — in terms of the process and content of the agreement — really been
warranted? What, ultimately, does this episode tell us about the perceptions
that Caribbean elites currently hold about the current and future trade and
development options of their countries?
In order to address these questions, the paper proceeds as follows. In the first
section we offer a brief overview of the different phases of development
thinking in the modern Caribbean, placing the EPA debate within its proper
historical and intellectual context. The next section details, again only briefly,
the background to the EPA with respect to the rise and fall of the Lome´ and
Cotonou trade agreements. We then turn, in the penultimate section, to a
critical analysis of both the substance of the CARIFORUM EPA and, more
importantly for our purposes, the arguments that have been advanced in the
region ‘for’ and ‘against’ the agreement. Finally, the conclusion aims to pull
together the various strands of the argument. Here we consider what this
episode ultimately says about the wider development predicament and
consequent room for policy manoeuvre that elites within the Caribbean
(and, by implication, other small preference-dependent economies) currently
possess in response to global changes over which they have no significant
control.
The diminishing panorama of Caribbean development alternatives
The Caribbean has long enjoyed a vibrant indigenous development debate, with
the close relationship between the region’s intellectual and policy communities
historically affording a range of often distinctive and original developmental
strategies. Yet, in recent years, the broad vista of conceptual and practical
development options that greeted Caribbean policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s
has narrowed markedly in tandem with the neoliberal ascendancy. Moreover, the
dominant paradigm within which development is pursued has come to be
Matthew Louis Bishop et al.
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generally applied from the outside (Booth 1985; Payne and Sutton 2001, 2007).
Practically, this has occurred against a backdrop of international trade liberal-
isation and the globalisation of increasingly complex and fragmented production
processes, which have, in turn, both eroded the foundations upon which post-war
Caribbean development was based and simultaneously created daunting barriers
to entry into the modern sectors of global growth. It is worth briefly charting this
tapering of intellectual and practical development alternatives (for more on this
subject, see Bishop 2012).
The first thinker to make an impact was the Nobel Prize-winning St. Lucian
economist, W. Arthur Lewis, who was responsible for providing ‘the first
cogent statement on the British West Indies as a unit of analysis by a
Caribbean thinker’ (Bernal et al. 1984: 10). Working in broadly the Keynesian
tradition, Lewis focused on the existential problems that beset the West Indies
and the kinds of interventions needed to resolve them. The principal issue,
in his view, was a lack of economic growth, which was the result of chronic
underemployment in Caribbean agriculture and a consequent savings rate
that was insufficient to stimulate capital investment. As such, in a series of
groundbreaking papers, Lewis (1950, 1954) argued that the solution was the
industrialisation of the region through encouraging foreign investment. This
would, he reasoned, augment the available stock of financial, human and
technological capital in order to facilitate growth through import substitution
(Lewis 1955). For Lewis, foreign capital was very much a means of kick-
starting an internal growth dynamic, rather than an end in itself, and in many
ways the strategy he proposed was a success, stimulating growth of around
5 per cent annually throughout the region until the various economic and
political crises of the 1970s began to bite. However, the approach failed to allay
the chronically high levels of unemployment and underemployment — and
thus inequality — which had provided the initial rationale for his theorising,
and was generally unable to alleviate dependence on primary products or
reverse ‘neo-colonial’ patterns of extraction and dependency, which were
actually reinforced by the inflows of foreign capital (Levitt 1996; ECLAC 2005;
Sutton 2006).
In response came the backlash from an authentic Caribbean brand of depen-
dency theory. Drawing on the work of the Latin American dependentistas,
the Caribbean formulation of the paradigm emerged from the studies being
undertaken by the so-called ‘New World Group’ within the University of the
West Indies, an eclectic gathering of younger, critical scholars (Demas 1965;
Girvan 1973; Ramphall 1977; Morrissey 1981). Their fundamental critique was
not, as one of the key members, Lloyd Best, subsequently noted, that Lewis
‘saw imperialism as part of the solution while we saw it as part of the problem’,
but rather that ‘we saw an underlying organisation of the world economy
which led to this persistent poverty in countries like our own’ (Best 1992: 11).
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Nonetheless, in a withering critique, Best and his colleague, Kari Levitt, coined
the term ‘industrialisation by invitation’ to denigrate the way Lewis deferred to
foreign capitalism. By contrast, they emphasised the continuing ‘metropolitan
dependence and the economic and social legacy of the plantation system’ in
order to develop a historical-structural-institutional approach to under-
standing Caribbean underdevelopment (Levitt 1996, 2005: 35).
As in Latin America, the Caribbean school was split between the loose
structuralism of Best, Levitt and others such as Jay Mandle, Owen Jefferson,
Norman Girvan and George Beckford, and those, such as Clive Thomas
and Walter Rodney, who postulated a more explicitly Marxian, and
thus ‘historical-materialist’, conception of the paradigm (Thomas 1974;
Payne 1984). Consequently, although these different groups converged to
some extent on the nature of the problem — dependency and under-
development — they diverged significantly when it came to proposing
solutions (Hettne 1995: 175). To borrow a phrase from Raphael Kaplinsky
(2005: 3), both groups saw the need for ‘fundamental structural change’,
but the former approach advocated working ‘for’ and improving the system
from within, whereas the latter proposed working ‘against’ the system and
replacing it with something new.
The importance of these debates lies less in the perceived value or otherwise
of the analyses themselves, and more in what they represented in terms of the
existence of a vibrant indigenous Caribbean discussion about development that
reviewed real intellectual and practical alternatives. However, just as wider
debates about development became increasingly bitter throughout the 1970s,
fuelled by real-world turbulence in the global economy, so the Caribbean
variant also gradually reached an impasse. Bjo¨rn Hettne (2008: 1) has noted
how development theory should be viewed as ‘a succession of discourses rather
than as an evolutionary process of theoretical improvement’, and it was at
this point that Caribbean development theory — like such theory elsewhere —
was transcended by a new discourse. As has been well recounted, this was
characterised by a resurgent liberalism embedded in what was termed the
‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1990). In response to the perceived
difficulties of the 1970s, this paradigm, as Girvan (2006b: 74–5) has noted, took
aim at Keynesianism in the ‘North’, as well as ‘its presumptive intellectual
offspring, developmentalism in the South’. In so doing, it promoted a private
sector-led development model that incorporated the now familiar roll-call of
neoliberal policies embodied in privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation.
Strongly influenced by the ‘Chicago School’ of neoclassical economic
liberalism, the Washington-based international financial institutions (IFIs),
meaning the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, along with
the United States (US) Treasury, disseminated these ideas as an incontestable,
‘internationally accepted common sense’ (Hutton 2002: 220).
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For the Caribbean, the accession to power of the Reagan government in the
US cemented the adherence of all governments in the region, almost without
exception, to ‘Washington Consensus’ norms and an acceptance of the market
as the engine of growth (Skelton 2004). The ‘carrot’ was provided by Reagan’s
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which promised aid and trade assistance to those
countries in the broader region that acknowledged and implemented neoliberal
policies (Deere 1990; Grugel 1995; Heron 2004), whereas the proverbial ‘stick’
was wielded in the invasion of Grenada, after which it became clear that radical
experiments of a similar ilk would not be tolerated. The vulnerability and
dependence of the small Caribbean states were cruelly exposed during this
period. They generally suffered from declining terms of trade in respect of the
primary products that dominated their relatively undiversified economies, and
this led to a desperate need to borrow, which only served to bring them under
the influence of the IMF, the World Bank and structural adjustment (Girvan
2006b).
As such, the developmental dynamic of the English-speaking Caribbean in
the 1980s was no longer endogenous to the region. Rather, ‘what was new, and
indeed intimidating, was the extent to which options open to Caribbean states
seemed to be overlaid, almost overwhelmed, by the interests and actions of the
USA’ (Payne 1998: 8). Once the 1980s passed into the 1990s, Cold War tension
eased, while structural adjustment simultaneously became further entrenched
and the US actually began to step back from its overt interference in Caribbean
affairs. Yet, rather than relief, this process only engendered ‘a new and intan-
gible sense of beleaguerment’ as the region began to contemplate its vulnerable
new position in a rapidly globalising world (Payne and Sutton 2007: 2). This
gave rise in 1992 to the establishment of the West Indian Commission and
its huge report, Time for Action, which covered every facet of the situation
facing the region (West Indian Commission 1992). However, despite making
a number of interesting suggestions pertaining to, for example, increased
cooperation and the deepening of the integration process, it still betrayed a
marked colonisation by neoliberal thinking, advocating a development model
for the post-1992 Caribbean almost wholly based on private sector-led growth.
This was perhaps unsurprising given that, by then, the dominance of
neoliberalism had fatigued most West Indian intellectuals who struggled to
come to terms with it. As a consequence, development as a political process
foundered against the technocratic approach favoured by the IFIs. As Paul
Sutton (2006) put it, the ‘politicos’ were replaced by the ‘te´cnicos’. The
discussions about development were no longer ones of grand design emanating
within the region for the region, but rather, and merely, about how best to
administer programmes designed elsewhere under the neoliberal paradigm.
By the turn of the century, the harshest formulations of neoliberal think-
ing had given way to what came to be termed the ‘post-Washington
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Consensus’, and in this vein the World Bank published two major reports on
the Caribbean. The first was a huge and detailed analysis entitled A Time
to Choose: Caribbean Development in the 21st Century (World Bank 2005a),
and the second, which had a focus on the members of the Organisation of
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), was called Towards a New Agenda for
Growth (World Bank 2005b). Although both reports were wide-ranging and
contained within them a torrent of recommendations, their main thrust
was clear: first, increased regional integration was a ‘critical input’ to improv-
ing competitiveness; second, the dismantling of trade preferences should be
welcomed and exchanged for technical support; third, taxes should be reduced,
along with customs duties, to encourage influxes in foreign direct investment;
fourth, the public sector should aim for ‘greater reliance on the private sector’
and become more cost-efficient; and, fifth, improving the quality of human
resources should serve to aid diversification and productivity (World Bank
2005a: xv).
Regardless of the utility or otherwise of these recommendations, what was
striking was the way in which they still fell squarely within the orthodoxy
of neoliberal thinking and offered a ‘one-size-fits-all’ development model.
There was little space made, for example, for a vibrant indigenous agriculture,
and even less for the kind of ‘selective engagement’ or ‘disengagement’
(Kaplinsky 2005) with the global economy that would involve the strategic use
of tools like taxes or duties or, most importantly, concerted government action
to shape proactively a country’s political economy. The larger report in fact
noted, with little sense of irony, that ‘during the analysis it was found that
countries were often too heterogeneous to permit easy classification’, but still
hoped that it might ‘serve as a tool to help countries develop their national
plans for development’ (World Bank 2005a: xvi). It was difficult, however, to
see exactly where — in the world envisaged by the Bank, in which Caribbean
states had created low-cost, low-intervention, low-tax, diversified service-based
economies that produced little of their own food and were more dependent
than ever upon external forces — the space for such a distinctive approach
might exist. As we shall see below, as the intellectual constraints upon
Caribbean development have steadily narrowed, the CARIFORUM–EU EPA
has now crystallised into law and has thus made statutory the limited
panorama of practical development alternatives that remain.
From Lome´ to Cotonou to EPA: the changing contours of EU
‘development cooperation’
The rise and fall of different intellectual currents within the English-
speaking Caribbean mirrors the shift in intellectual paradigms that have
Matthew Louis Bishop et al.
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informed different approaches to what EU officials were traditionally — and
are still — fond of calling ‘development cooperation’. Of course, in historical
terms, the catalyst for the formation of a distinctively European development
policy for the Caribbean was the United Kingdom’s accession to the Common
Market in 1973, which brought with it post-colonial responsibility for the
newly independent (and soon-to-be-independent) developing countries of the
Commonwealth. Yet the early phase of European development policy was also
an intellectual product of its time, in the sense that it was influenced by broadly
the same economic ideas that helped to shape the ‘Keynesian’ and more radical
phases of Caribbean development thinking. In practical terms, the accession of
the UK to the Common Market required extending the geographical focus of
the Yaounde´ Convention — which had offered reciprocal trade preferences to
18 former African colonies of France and Belgium since 1963 — to include the
Caribbean and Pacific, although not South Asian, Commonwealth states
(Ravenhill 2004). The timing of this was significant for two reasons. On the one
hand, UK accession coincided with the ‘oil shock’ of 1973 which, coupled with
the related boom in other primary commodity prices, instilled a sense of acute
nervousness in European capitals regarding the future security of supply for
key raw materials, many of which were located in the former colonies. On the
other hand, the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the first Lome´
Convention were influenced by the international climate of the mid-1970s,
characterised by ‘Third World’ demands for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO). Indeed, Lome´ I (1975–1979) stands in retrospect as something
of a highpoint in the attempt by the developing world to redefine North–South
relations, in the sense that the agreement was at least rhetorically consistent
with the spirit of the NIEO (Brown 2000: 372).
Against this backdrop, the first Lome´ Convention was signed on 28 April,
1975 between the nine developed countries belonging to what was then the
European Economic Community and 46 developing counties belonging to the
newly created ACP group of countries. Unlike the Yaounde´ Convention,
preferences under Lome´ were granted on a non-reciprocal basis (although
in practice full reciprocity had never really existed under Yaounde´). Perhaps
more importantly, Lome´ established a series of highly lucrative commodity
protocols — for bananas, beef, rum and sugar — offering eligible ACP states
guaranteed prices far in excess of those available on the world market (due to
the price-distorting effects of the Common Agricultural Policy). Reflecting the
spirit of the NIEO, Lome´ also included a substantial aid component financed
through the European Development Fund, plus compensatory mechanisms
to assist countries suffering price fluctuations for primary commodities
(STABEX) and to guarantee the production of certain minerals (SYSMIN).
Finally, Lome´ was governed by an elaborate set of joint ACP–EU institutions,
including a Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors and Joint
Journal of International Relations and Development
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Parliamentary Assembly. The logic underpinning this institutional design
was that Lome´ represented a departure from traditional schemes like the
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) because it was both legally
contractual (unlike the GSP, which could be withdrawn unilaterally at any
time by the preference-granting country) and based on a ‘partnership of
equals’.
In these ways, then, the first Lome´ convention constituted a relatively
groundbreaking approach to international development, offering a series of
innovative trade and aid measures tied to what appeared to be genuinely
democratic institutional arrangements. In practice, however, Lome´ suffered
from a number of crucial flaws. First, although supposedly based on a
‘partnership of equals’ between the EU on the one hand and the ACP on the
other, the latter constituted for the most part little more than a geographical
expression that had effectively been invented by officials in Brussels in order
to make Lome´ possible (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 126). The consequence
was that the ACP always lacked the collective political agency necessary to the
make the ‘partnership of equals’ a reality. To make matters worse, in foregoing
the principle of reciprocity, the ACP abandoned the one form of substantive
bargaining leverage that might have acted to mitigate, although if only slightly,
the vast disparities in economic power between itself and the EU. In the
absence of this, the ACP came to embrace instead what John Ravenhill
(1985) called ‘collective clientelism’, by which he meant that the ACP had
little alternative but to rely on the generosity of Lome´, and EU largesse
more generally, to forward its collective interests. However, as Ravenhill (2004:
122) later observed, this strategy was only viable so long as the EU was
prepared to continue to carry the economic and political burden of maintaining
what over time became increasingly unpopular, and globally unacceptable,
non-reciprocal trade preferences.
Changes to the Lome´ system eventually came, emanating from two different
directions. The first emerged from within the EU itself. In 1996, the European
Commission published its landmark Green Paper on Relations between the
European Union and the ACP Countries, which made the startling admission
that Lome´ had been an almost unqualified failure in meeting its principal
objectives. No matter what economic benefits had been bestowed on individual
farmers and commodity producers, the EU focused on the fact that, despite
25 years of trade preferences and generous aid provision, Lome´ had signally
failed to promote export growth or diversification. In fact, quite the reverse
had occurred: between 1976 and 1994, ACP exports to the EU as a proportion
of the total shrank from 6.7 per cent to 3.4 per cent, while the ACP’s overall
share of world trade fell from 3 per cent to 1 per cent (Gibb 2000: 463). Also
serving to harden European attitudes towards Lome´ was the further
enlargement of the EU to include Spain, Portugal and, to differing degrees,
Matthew Louis Bishop et al.
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the Nordic countries, which generally saw little logic in a pro-development
policy based on targeting aid at countries with strong colonial links to certain
member states and excluding other, equally or even poorer, countries without
this historical connection. Crucially, both the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and
the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 made references to the need to integrate
‘developing countries into the world economy’, with particular emphasis on
‘the most disadvantaged among them’. The implication for the ACP was clear:
Lome´ was living on borrowed time because it was based neither on sound
development criteria (although 39 of the 71 ACP states were classified by the
United Nations in 2001 as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the rest were
not) nor on proven success in integrating the ACP into the world economy
(Ravenhill 2004: 126-27).
The second, more widely cited, source of change came from a series
of adverse legal rulings against the EU’s banana protocol under both the
GATT and the WTO. Although much has been made of the role of the WTO
in precipitating the demise of Lome´ (not least by the EU itself), it is worth
pointing out that the original banana dispute was provoked by the creation of
the single banana market in 1992 as part of the implementation of the Single
European Act (Alter and Meunier 2006). Despite this, in 1994 the GATT ruled
that the Lome´ Convention was inconsistent with both the most-favoured-
nation clause, because it did not constitute a ‘free trade area’ or ‘customs
union’ (due to the lack of reciprocity), and the 1979 Enabling Clause, because it
discriminated between developing countries. In response, the EU immediately
sought and received a 5-year waiver for Lome´ (although this did not prevent
further legal challenges to the banana regime) in advance of the introduction of
the much-strengthened WTO disputes settlement mechanism (DSM) in 1995.
Although the EU possessed the option to seek a further waiver — for which
there were numerous other precedents under both the GATT and WTO — it
soon intimated that its intention would be to recast the entire ACP trade
relationship in such a way as to make it ‘WTO compatible’. The reason given
was that the tightening of rules covering the granting of legal waivers under the
WTO (requiring a 75 per cent as opposed to a 66 per cent majority for
approval) meant that such a request was unlikely to succeed. Many questioned
this interpretation, and the truth was that the banana dispute merely added
grist to the mill of an increasingly dominant view within the EU that Lome´
had long passed its sell-by date.
The fate of Lome´ did not, however, rest simply on a dispassionate
reassessment of its technical and legal merits following the enlargement of the
EU and the strengthening of international trade rules. As William Brown
(2000) has pointed out, the deeper point was that these matters were
themselves being shaped by a more fundamental shift in the ideological
underpinnings of global economic governance in general and EU ‘develop-
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ment cooperation’ in particular. Although Lome´ was premised on the notion
of ‘ideological neutrality’, wherein the effectiveness of alternative pro-
grammes and policies was deemed to be measurable against objective
development criteria, over time this sentiment was replaced by faith in the
universalism of neoliberal doctrine and policy conditionality along the lines
of structural adjustment, good governance and the other parts of this
package. By the time that Lome´ was renewed for the fourth time in 1990,
language had already been introduced supportive of the wider structural
adjustment efforts of the IFIs, while the 1995 mid-term revision went even
further by attaching explicit political conditions to development aid for the
first time. These changes provided an ideological snapshot of what was in
store for the ACP following the conclusion of the Cotonou Partnership Act of
2000, which finally replaced the Lome´ Convention as the basis for governing
EU–ACP trade relations.
Although the 1996 Green Paper had identified a number of alternative
options (including the maintenance of the status quo, the standard application
of GSP and the establishment of a single agreement based on the principle
of uniform reciprocity), the trade component of the Cotonou Agreement
eventually settled on the formula of replacing Lome´ with separate EPAs based
on six ‘regions’ as identified by the Commission, namely: the Caribbean;
West Africa; Central Africa; Eastern and Southern Africa; and Southern
Africa (SADC-minus).2 In order to make this possible, the EU would seek
an extension to the WTO waiver (which was subsequently granted during the
2001 Doha Ministerial in Qatar) in order to allow the ACP sufficient breath-
ing space to prepare for the EPA negotiations, scheduled to begin in September
2002 and end no later than 31 December, 2007. The Cotonou Agreement,
however, made special provisions for LDCs, which would be granted Lome´-
equivalent duty- and quota-free preferences under what became the ‘Every-
thing but Arms’ (EBA) agreement of 2001. By including the handful of
UN-designated LDCs that had been excluded from Lome´, the EBA effectively
got around the issue of WTO incompatibility since the regime was now legally
consistent with the 1979 Enabling Clause.
Yet, for CARIFORUM, which, with the sole exception of Haiti, is made up
entirely of ‘non-LDCs’, the EU’s proposed solution to the problem of WTO
compatibility was far from ideal. The reason was clear: since non-LDCs were
by definition ineligible for Lome´-equivalent preferences available through the
EBA initiative, the only alternative was to sign up to fully reciprocal
agreements in exchange for trade benefits that they already received. Although
the Cotonou Agreement did make reference to offering countries that failed
to sign an EPA a trade framework at least ‘equivalent to their existing
situation’, in practice, given that Cotonou had introduced a deadline of
December 2007 for the conclusion of the EPAs, the only other available option
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was the substantially inferior GSP programme (which offered preferences on
approximately 54 per cent of tariff lines in contrast to approximately
95 per cent under Lome´). Hence, CARIFORUM and the other non-LDCs
were confronted with an unpalatable choice: either negotiate a fully reciprocal
EPA or run the risk of their trade access being downgraded to GSP terms.
Finally, not only did Cotonou require the establishment of WTO-compatible
EPAs, but Articles 41–52 of the Agreement also made provision (although
rather vaguely) for reciprocal liberalisation in a whole raft of ‘trade-related’
areas like services, investment and intellectual property that were not covered
by the original Lome´ protocol, and thus not subject to WTO litigation. The
choice for CARIFORUM was therefore not simply whether or not to sign
a WTO-compatible EPA; it also centred on the necessity or desirability of
concluding a ‘WTO-plus’ agreement going far beyond what was strictly
necessary to satisfy multilateral trade rules.
The road less travelled: the CRNM and the CARIFORUM EPA
As we suggested in the introduction, the main analytical thrust of the critical
commentary generated by the CARIFORUM EPA has focused on its technical
aspects and likely distributive effects. Our attention here is somewhat different,
and necessitates a focus on the politics behind the agreement. Specifically, we
wish to advance an analysis of why the Caribbean — through the CRNM —
negotiated the particular EPA it did, in the way it did, and what this tells us
about the diminishing panorama of the region’s development alternatives. One
way of looking at this (as in Bishop 2011; Heron and Siles-Bru¨gge 2012) would
be to focus on the structural power brought to bear on the negotiations by the
EU which the Caribbean struggled to resist. Yet although the EU approach
forms a crucial part of the story, for our purposes here it does not really help us
to understand the motivations on the Caribbean side of the equation and the
very real — although certainly constrained — choices that actors consciously
made. Another way of answering the question would be to ponder the broader
implications of the EPA, particularly as it relates to the trade-off between
retaining the immediate economic benefits of continued market access for
exports (which the EU was threatening to rescind unilaterally in the event of a
delayed or non-agreement) against the longer-term cost of sacrificing policy
autonomy (Heron 2011). And yet another method would be to show how the
politics of the EPA developed during the negotiating period, why the different
actors advocated and pursued certain lines of agreement, and where all of this
fitted into the prevailing structural asymmetries between the Caribbean and the
EU. It is this latter approach that characterises our agenda for the remainder of
the discussion.
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The official view
During the late 1990s, it became clear that the Caribbean was ill-equipped to
deal with the intensification of various processes of hemispheric regionalisation
that had been led, in part, by the energetic, multilateral approach of the
Clinton administration in the US. Given that, in addition to the discussion of a
potential Free Trade Area of the Americas and the emerging agenda of the
newly established WTO, the region also had to negotiate the post-Lome´
settlement with the EU— while simultaneously dealing with its own, awkward,
internal processes of integration via the creation of the Caribbean Single
Market and Economy (CSME) in 2006 — it was acknowledged that the
CARICOM Secretariat would be unlikely to be able to manage successfully the
full range of competing demands placed upon it in the field of external
negotiations. The CRNM was thus created as a special, time-limited institution
that was separate from, yet still linked to, CARICOM, with a mandate for
handling the negotiations (Grant 2000). Indeed, in the initial formulation, the
CRNM was considered as very much an appendage of the CARICOM
Secretariat, with the latter remaining the preeminent institution of regional
governance.
However, far from being a simple and understated organ of technocracy, the
CRNM quickly established a forceful personality of its own characterised by
‘a distinctive and somewhat provocative organisational structure’ (Payne and
Sutton 2007: 13), which afforded it significant freedom from the Secretariat
(even sidelining the latter to some degree) and substantively went well beyond
what was initially envisioned in terms of its capacity both to set agendas and to
strike deals. This derived in large part from the gravitas, personality and
connections of its first head, Sir Shridath Ramphal. Cedric Grant (2000: 473)
also noted two other important changes that were implemented at this time:
one institutional, the other intellectual. The former was a decision taken,
commensurate with Ramphal’s own standing, to upgrade the post of Chief
Negotiator from Ambassadorial to Ministerial rank, with the incumbent
therefore able to bypass the CARICOM Secretariat and report directly to the
CARICOM Heads of Government. The latter was a forceful attempt to get the
CRNM to take a pro-liberalisation, pro-reciprocity stance in negotiations.
With the commencement of the Doha Round in 2001, Ramphal stood down
and was replaced by Richard Bernal, a former Jamaican ambassador to the US
and a technocrat rather than a politician. Nevertheless, under Bernal, the
CRNM maintained, and even entrenched, its position of relative autonomy.
This was of particular significance in the Caribbean regional context since,
formally, this allows no juridical space for executive authority residing beyond
the Heads of Government and the sovereignties that they embody (Bishop and
Payne 2010). Moreover, and perhaps more apposite to the discussion here,
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as the EPA negotiations intensified, the perception was created — particularly
in the minds of critics of the agreement — that the CRNM not only exercised
authority well beyond its remit, but was almost entirely responsible for the
unsatisfactory conclusion to the whole process.
It is certainly fair to say that the CRNM was pro-liberalisation, as well as
highly activist in its dealings with the EU. Part of the explanation for this
is that both Ramphal and Bernal surrounded themselves with like-minded and
proactive technocrats who viewed the negotiation process as an opportunity
for the Caribbean to profit from the liberalisation of trading relations with
the EU. Moreover, there is little doubt that, overall, the quality of human
resources enjoyed by the CRNM was considerably superior to those at the
disposal of the Secretariat. One only has to consider the range and number of
reports it produced, or indeed interview some of its staff, to understand that
the CRNM as an institution was endowed with considerable intellectual
capacity, drive and confidence. For its part, the EU was more than ready to
negotiate a full EPA and, moreover, to do so quickly. Because both the CRNM
and the EU engaged with each other in a cooperative fashion, it could therefore
be argued that, as one observer has suggested, ‘not a lot was surprising’ about
the process.3
Nonetheless, the official CRNM line is important to understand. It justified
its approach in four main ways. First, it was suggested that, because the
Caribbean was already relatively unified both regionally and developmentally,
it made sense to press ahead with the negotiations. There was recognition on
the part of all actors of the legally and temporally binding nature of Cotonou.
CARICOM and the CSME had long since been created (although, in the case
of the latter, not fully implemented) and, given that Haiti was the only LDC
in the region, there was little option for the negotiation of ‘Special and
Differentiated Treatment’ or recourse to any other system of preferential
treatment such as the EBA. In this sense, the EPA was the only game in town.
Second, the CRNM negotiators took the view that, because they were so well
briefed, and because they were taking an early, positive, activist approach to
the negotiations, important benefits and concessions could be extracted from
the EU that would not be available to other intra-ACP regional groupings.
Third, the case was made that the EPA was not actually about entrenching the
remaining market access for those Caribbean export commodities that had
hitherto enjoyed preferences. Rather, it was predicated upon a recognition that
the composition of many of the region’s economies had long been undergoing a
process of reconfiguration towards services, and the claim that only a full EPA,
with its services component, would be able to provide the requisite market
access for new Caribbean services exports that could, in theory and over time,
climb the value chain. The timing of the process was critical in the minds of
the negotiators. Their assumption was that, if the region were to profit from
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the so-called ‘dynamic benefits’ of the agreement, which were expected to
derive especially from the services and investment component and the chapters
on ‘development co-operation’, it would have to be concluded — and then
implemented — swiftly. Fourth, and most important, the CRNM was
ideologically convinced by the EPA. In advocating the region’s offensive
interests, it was far more optimistic than many other Caribbean academics,
diplomats and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) about the develop-
ment potential of the neoliberal approach to trade. As one negotiator put it,
‘we make no bones about the fact that we have a different development
paradigm to the old guard’. The implication was that, for the Caribbean,
adjustment was necessary, welcome and long overdue.4
The ‘WTO-plus’ nature of the EPA is the element that has attracted the
greatest criticism and done most to place the CRNM on the defensive. In a
policy briefing (CRNM 2008) published shortly before the institution was
disbanded (of which more later), six principal ‘motivations’ were stressed to
explain why a ‘WTO-plus’ EPA was negotiated. These were as follows: (1) to
‘bind’ prevailing levels of EU preferences and safeguard them against potential
legal challenges in the WTO; (2) to improve EU market access; (3) to
encourage diversification away from an export agriculture that was increas-
ingly subject to preference erosion and towards higher value-added expor-
tables; (4) to provide impetus to the ailing regional integration movement;
(5) to ameliorate issues of regulatory harmonisation and capacity building to
assist Caribbean firms in exploiting EU markets; and (6) to transmit ‘a forceful
signal — to both investors and development partners — of the earnestness of a
[sic] Caribbean’s programme of economic reform’. A fuller critique of the
technical merits and demerits of these points can be found elsewhere (Heron
2011). The key point to stress here is that there was, in essence, broad
agreement from most of those close to the process that negotiating a ‘full’ EPA
was far preferable to a ‘goods only’ or ‘interim’ agreement. This was justified
by the assertion that the EPA should be viewed as a whole, rather than as a
series of discrete technical decisions.
In a similar vein, Errol Humphrey (2008), Ambassador of Barbados and a
senior member of the College of EPA Negotiators, has crystallised the CRNM
view by suggesting four fundamental reasons why a full EPA was signed in the
timeframe it was. These were: (1) the threat of EU withdrawal of market access
at the expiry of the Cotonou waiver; (2) the thorny issue of goods in the latter
stages of negotiations; (3) the holistic nature of the full EPA, the ability to
secure the region’s ‘offensive interests’ in services and the oft-cited ‘develop-
ment cooperation’ elements; and (4) the ‘maintaining’ of the ‘integrity’ of
Caribbean integration by means of preventing fragmentation via the signing of
several independent bilateral agreements with the EU. What is interesting is the
fact that it was only the question of market access for goods that was especially
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contentious in the negotiations (this was the reason why it was left until the end
of the process). This is quite revealing, since, intuitively, one would expect what
were in WTO parlance called the ‘Singapore issues’ (competition policy,
transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation and investment)
to have been far the most difficult to resolve given the opposition to them
that exists at the multilateral level; yet, in the CARIFORUM EPA, this
was not the case. These aspects of the EPA, which have been hugely
controversial elsewhere, were negotiated quickly and comprehensively, whereas
the Caribbean’s legacy interest in goods — which would have been subject
to heavy preference erosion and declining terms of trade, whatever the out-
come — remained the most tricky to resolve. This is suggestive of a significant
degree of unity between the CRNM and, at least, the Heads of Government,
during the early stages of the negotiations. In summary, then, the CRNM’s
defence of the agreement has been predicated on the idea that, because its
negotiators had a sound working relationship with their EU counterparts, it
was able to negotiate assertively — and thus secure — a better deal than would
otherwise have been possible.5
The critical view
However, as indicated earlier, the intervening period since the signing of the
EPA has witnessed the CRNM come under heavy and sustained attack from
within the region, with the critique focused upon two broad areas. First, critics
questioned the extent to which the CRNM did actually achieve a good deal in
terms of the technical aspects of the EPA, in effect positing the notion that
there may have been some kind of preferable alternative arrangement that
could have been sought and achieved. Second, they denounced the way
in which the CRNM engaged with the EU, as well as other Caribbean
stakeholders, during the negotiations. As Norman Girvan (2009a: 8) has
described it, the critique has been composed of both ‘content’ and ‘process’
components.
As regards content, there were three elements. First, detractors inveighed
against the ‘WTO-plus’ nature of the EPA, in particular the services and
government procurement components that, it was suggested, offered the EU
too great a level of reciprocal market access to the Caribbean. This was deemed
to have worrying implications for local services providers, particularly those
who sell to regional governments (Sanders 2010). In addition, the fact that the
Caribbean was happy to accede to a ‘WTO-plus’ agreement, incorporating
many of the Singapore issues, was said to carry with it other problems. One
was that the region would now find it difficult to defend its services sector in
bilateral trade agreements with other countries and blocs, such as in the present
negotiations with Canada. Another related concern was the suggestion that,
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with ‘Third World’ unity now broken, the rules that are coming to shape the
application of the Singapore issues are being constructed outside the relative
comfort of the multilateral setting in arenas where asymmetric power relations
between the parties are much sharper.6 In any case, it was widely argued that
the technical barriers to trade are practically so great that market access to the
EU for many Caribbean services was likely to be, at best, difficult to exploit
and, at worst, meaningless. This problem would be intensified further
as greater numbers of (more competitive) countries and regions also come to
sign free trade agreements with the EU (Jessop 2010). What this debate
really shows, in our view, is a straightforward ontological disagreement
between critics and supporters of the EPA. For the former, who are inherently
suspicious of the neoliberal approach to trade and development, a more
defensive approach to protecting Caribbean markets would have been
preferred. The latter, by contrast, resist what they consider a reification of
the Caribbean’s weaknesses, stressing instead the need to find ways of exploit-
ing the new market access offered by the EPA. In many ways, this is not a new
theme in Caribbean political economy; the divisions that existed over the
solution to the debt crises of the 1970s and the painful structural reforms
subsequently undertaken, especially by Jamaica, saw similar disagreements
between liberals and those of a more developmentalist bent.
The second major line of critique took issue with the assertions of the
CRNM and other supporters of the agreement that a major guiding principle
of the negotiations had been ‘that development should infuse all aspects of the
EPA’ (Humphrey 2008: 6). This argument, in effect, was that trade policy was a
development tool, underpinned by the neoliberal assumption that ‘developing
countries with open trade regimes spur economic development’ (Lodge 2010).
However, as the critics noted, the causal relationship between liberalised trade
and economic development is, at best, unclear (Gavin 2007). Moreover, the
much-trumpeted ‘development cooperation’ section of the EPA was only one
of 250 articles and consisted almost entirely of trade and export facilitation
measures. This may well be a noble policy objective in its own right, but it does
highlight the existence at the heart of the EPA of a somewhat emaciated vision
of what development actually is or could be. Similarly, although many
references to such cooperation do pepper the entire document, the criticism
was that these were all loosely defined and were ‘neither quantified nor time-
bound’ (Brewster et al. 2008: 8).
The final content issue relates to the implications of the EPA for regional
unity, which was, again, something that had been heavily promoted by its
defenders (Gill 2010). This critique is complex and multidimensional, but
focused generally on the ways in which the regional integration process was
allegedly undermined. One aspect highlighted was the fact that, in relation
to the EPA, CARICOM had been relatively sidelined in favour of, first, the
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CRNM, and, later, CARIFORUM, even though the former was supposed to
be subservient to existing regional governance arrangements, and the latter
has no legal personality. A second aspect reflected the other side of this
equation: the thorny problem within Caribbean regionalism of the Dominican
Republic, which, although a member of CARIFORUM — indeed, being the
principal reason for its creation — has been excluded consciously from some
CARICOM mechanisms, such as the recently established implementation unit,
because the country has not been welcomed as a member of CARICOM. With
no little irony, Karl Falkenberg (2010), the head of the EU delegation during
the negotiations, has expressed shock at how the English-speaking Caribbean
has actually been prepared to open up and expose itself more nakedly to the
economic might of the EU than it has towards its own members, and, in
particular, the Dominican Republic. Moreover, caught between these shifting
sands, it is the CSME that is far behind its own implementation schedule
and is, in so many areas, potentially challenged by the provisions of the
EPA (Girvan 2009b). Finally, the broader question was raised as to how
an agreement that promotes the neoliberalisation of the region’s trading
relationships can really be expected to aid something — namely, Caribbean
regionalism — that has always been, rhetorically at least, more holistic and
political. Embedding an open, market-based trading regime is manifestly not
the same as constructing regional institutions of political governance that are
supposed to have a genuinely ‘developmental’ role (Payne 2009).
Turning now to the process part of the critique, this also centred upon three
main considerations. The first pertained to the way in which the CRNM
was perceived to have excluded civil society and other regional stakeholders
from the negotiations, which was as much an implicit phenomenon as it was
explicit. Girvan (2009a: 9) has described it as ‘a technification-sweetification-
treatyfication syndrome’. By this he meant, first, that the excessively technical
character of the negotiations rendered ‘the substantive issues inaccessible to
non-specialists’ and, concomitantly, granted the negotiators a ‘monopoly over
understanding the technical aspects of the agreement’, thereby increasing their
‘leverage’ and ‘capacity to rebut critics’. ‘Sweetification’ is the process of
exaggerating the benefits of the agreement, while ‘treatyfication’ describes its
legal institutionalisation, which therefore ‘subverts democratic governance and
national sovereignty’. In addition, part of the explanation for the relative lack
of civil society input — and subsequent ‘buy-in’ — was the limited technical,
institutional and financial capacity that NGOs in the region were able to bring
to bear upon negotiations simultaneously taking place in different locations far
from the Caribbean. All parties have agreed that the level of civil society
participation was less than satisfactory and something that should have been
mitigated. As one diplomat has put it, there was ‘regional dialogue and
analysis’, but, generally, academics, NGOs and, revealingly, even ministers
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were relatively distant from the negotiations. Although all had some input,
there was no mechanism in place to ensure that this happened in a consistent
and ongoing manner.7 Members of the CRNM have even admitted as much
themselves, pointing out that they were often able to bypass Caribbean
(national and regional) diplomats in Brussels and Geneva to deal directly with
Heads of Government and, consequently, ‘marginalise those who did not have
the same technical nous’ in order to conclude the agreement swiftly and
comprehensively. The CRNM, in this view, was justified in sidestepping
important institutional processes ‘because [they] had failed’.8 As another
official (Silva 2010) noted, ‘all too often ... regional secretariats and regional
officials operate on a separate wavelength from their counterparts in capitals’.
Nonetheless, the perception took root in many quarters that this exclusionary
approach, although effective no doubt in reaching a conclusion to the
negotiations, nevertheless damaged both the image of the CRNM and the
reception of the EPA throughout the Caribbean.
Related to this, the second procedural line of critique focused upon the
relationship of the CRNM with the EU negotiators. Principally, critics asserted
that this was far too close for comfort. There is little doubt that the Caribbean
negotiators enjoyed a familiar and friendly working relationship with their
EU counterparts. Indeed, this was not something that was ever hidden or
downplayed. Rather, CRNM members celebrated the fact that, in their view,
such relations, along with their technical competence, meant that ‘the EU
viewed us as worthy interlocutors’.9 Yet, for some, this was still problematic.
They have suggested that trust in the CRNM on the part of some member
states evaporated towards the end of the negotiations, as it became clear that
there was significant intellectual and technical overlap between its staff and the
EU negotiating team. This convergence was deemed to stem, at least in part,
from the deliberate cultivation of a dependent relationship by Europe,
sustained in turn by the fact that the EU has funded some of the external
research activities of key people.10 Furthermore, even in the post-EPA period,
this allegation of implicit collaboration has not gone away, with NGOs being
highly critical of the way in which the Caribbean has been actively promoting
the EPA in an attempt to ‘export the agreement to Africa’, and thus is
‘effectively doing the EC’s job for it’.11
The third consideration, which underpins the discussion above, questions the
perceived legitimacy of the CRNM as an institution and points out the ways
in which it is supposed to have gone beyond its remit in the negotiations.
Particularly towards the end of the process, rifts appeared between the different
governments, with the ire of some directed towards the CRNM, the perception
being that the institution had overstepped its mandate in negotiating
a considerably more liberal EPA than was palatable to some countries. This
can be explained in large measure by the different trading profiles of the
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CARIFORUM member states. Some, such as Barbados and Jamaica, had
extensive interests in services, which were aggressively pursued.12 Yet for
others, such as the OECS, the key fears related to preference erosion and the
relative lack of competiveness in services vis-a`-vis the bigger regional players.
Perhaps the most notable example of these problems emerged towards the end,
where Guyanese President Bharrat Jagdeo refused to sign the EPA, demand-
ing a number of different assurances — and even going to so far as to threaten
to only sign a goods-only version of the agreement — before finally acceding.
This caused something of a diplomatic spat between Guyana and some of the
other member states, as well as the CRNM itself. Plus, of course, there remains
the perennially thorny question of the Dominican Republic, a country that is
similar in size — of both economy and population — to the entire Anglophone
Caribbean. The relationship that underpinned CARIFORUM was, at best, an
uncomfortable one, as most of the wider region, including the bigger players,
were extremely fearful of the competitive prowess of Dominican industrial
and service firms, not to mention the country’s significant diplomatic capacity.
In a broad sense, however, the legitimacy issue would seem to be a somewhat
weak argument. The CRNM’s default defence is that the governments ‘signed
off’ on the agreement, thus leaving the buck essentially with them. This is
surely right: in terms of due process it is unfair to lay subsequent blame for the
final outcome at the negotiators’ door.13 At the same time, however, this
defence relies on a somewhat circular argument, in the sense that the
negotiators have consistently emphasised that it was only because of their
considerable technical capacity that such a complex and comprehensive
agreement could have been achieved. To then suggest that the governments of
tiny microstates such as Grenada, St. Lucia or Dominica — which at best now
have an EPA ‘implementation unit’ with just one or two people working in it,
or at worst have simply added responsibility for this massive task to the
burgeoning portfolio of a single official who also has to cope with a range of
other trade-related work — should be able to comprehend, digest and review
enormous volumes of text containing opaque rules on highly technical matters
is somewhat disingenuous. In practice, they would simply have had little choice
but to place their trust in the CRNM and hope for the best.
Before moving on, we should briefly note here the main elements of potential
alternatives mooted by critics of the EPA. Some — particularly the NGOs —
have tended to assert that the EU could have either renegotiated a new
Cotonou waiver or possibly fashioned some kind of ‘GSP-plus’ arrangement
that was still WTO compatible. The former argument displays, in our view,
considerable wishful thinking. As for the latter, although such a deal may have
been feasible, the EPA was considered by the official Caribbean — as we have
been at pains to point out in this paper — to be as much about securing
offensive interests in services as protecting its diminishing goods profile. As one
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negotiator (Silva 2010) has argued, ‘too often [critical] stakeholders accus-
tomed to decades of unilateral trade preferences and no-strings-attached aid
budgets see trade liberalisation as a zero-sum game, and one where ACP
countries are likely to lose’. Enhanced GSP would not, from this perspective,
have sated the desire to access the purported positive-sum benefits that they
believed would accrue from a full EPA.
A more substantive set of alternative proposals came from the Caribbean
academic community. For example, Havelock Brewster, Norman Girvan and
Vaughan Lewis (2008) pressed in the immediate period before the signing of the
EPA for its renegotiation. Specifically, they argued that, because of the
asymmetrical power relationships at work in the negotiating process, the end
agreement was inherently unbalanced, with the majority of future benefits likely to
flow, exponentially, to the EU. In addition, they highlighted a range of conflicts,
especially those relating to the confusion, division and fragmentation of regional
institutions, which served in their view to undermine Caribbean developmental
unity. In essence, their proposed solution was a renegotiation of the ‘WTO-plus’
commitments of the EPA until such time as these become accepted within the
multilateral framework, along with a general postponement or deceleration of
the entire EPA process to allow for a more thorough consultative effort within the
region. Had their call been heeded, it is plausible that the Caribbean, like the rest
of the ACP, could have stalled for more time to consider the implications of the
EPA. Such thinking rested on the belief that the EU would not have risked the
public relations disaster of following through on its promise to raise the tariff
drawbridge, particularly given both the collapse of the Doha Round and the
significant leeway that has since been granted to the several African and Pacific
countries that reluctantly initialled agreements. Furthermore, although it is
probably true to say that the EU would not have been prepared to seek a fresh
Cotonou waiver at the WTO, it is also not clear whether maintenance of the pre-
EPA status quo for some time would necessarily have invited a legal challenge
through the DSM, or, if mounted, whether such a challenge would have
succeeded. If nothing else, this would have initiated a lengthy process of
investigation and discussion, potentially buying the region more time in a global
context where, post-crisis, trade liberalisation at all costs perhaps seems to be
somewhat less fashionable than in the recent past.
In the final analysis, it has to be said that, whatever the relative merits of the
arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ the EPA, the fact that a comprehensive agree-
ment has been signed and successfully ratified by all signatories — indeed, most
of the mobilisation against EPA did not take place until after the agreement
was reached — renders further debate genuinely academic. Some clear lessons,
moreover, emerge from this period. Most notably, and despite the brinkman-
ship exercised by President Jagdeo that we noted above, few additional
concessions were actually gained at the end of the negotiations. This illustrates
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the limited options open to Caribbean states — both individually and
collectively — that comprise the core theme of this paper. Nevertheless, in
reality, the intensity of the debate shows no signs of letting up, even though it
is now four years since the agreement was reached; indeed, more significantly,
it continues to impact directly on the politics and governance of the region.
For example, during the thirtieth Annual Conference of the CARICOM
Heads of Government, held in Guyana on 2–4 July, 2009, the decision was
taken to ‘rebrand’ the CRNM as the Office of Trade Negotiations, to redefine
its operational remit and to incorporate it within the CARICOM Secretariat.
Yet the emasculation of the CRNM does not settle the matter. Because the
EPA negotiations were premised on using quasi-autonomous regional institu-
tions to negotiate what are in effect a series of bilateral free trade agreements,
Caribbean governments that deferred — with greater or lesser degrees of
enthusiasm — to the superior technical competence and negotiating capacity of
the CRNM now find themselves responsible for implementing highly technical
agreements about which, in some cases, they may have very little under-
standing. Because the CARIFORUM agreement is characterised by lengthy
transition periods designed to cushion the effects of liberalisation, it is likely to
be some considerable time before the full effects of this ‘implementation
problem’ become apparent. Given the contentious nature of the agreement and
the demonstrative lack of enthusiasm that many stakeholders in region have
shown for its contents, it would perhaps not be too churlish to point out that
that the full realisation of the EPA — at least in the idealised form envisioned
by the CRNM and the EU — is far from assured. Indeed, the debate today
in the region is shifting very rapidly on to the implementation question, with
those involved in the negotiations warning starkly that the dynamic advantages
that the EPA supposedly presaged will gradually evaporate if Caribbean
countries fail to grasp them in a timely manner (Chaitoo 2010).
This issue is becoming particularly pressing as the EU moves to wrap up
similar agreements with more powerful and better-organised competitors in
Central America and the Andean region, and even potentially with the South
American Common Market (MERCOSUR) as whole. Moreover, a range of
paradoxes exist in the comparisons that can be made between the current EU–
Canada trade negotiations, in which serious reservations are beginning to
emerge regarding Canada’s asymmetrical weaknesses vis-a`-vis Europe (Sinclair
2010), and the Canada–Caribbean talks, wherein by contrast it is the relative
weakness of the Caribbean vis-a`-vis Canada that is striking.
Conclusion
What, then, can be said by way of conclusion about the politics of the
CARIFORUM–EU EPA? The answer varies according to the level at which
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the analysis is undertaken. Assessing the fierce debate that has unfolded in the
Caribbean following the signing of the agreement between what we have
dubbed here the ‘official’ and ‘critical’ views, it can hardly be denied that the
critics succeeded in scoring several valid points. As they broadly argued,
the content of the agreement was indeed ‘WTO-plus’, did not have an
especially strong development dimension (at least as traditionally understood)
and at best complicated and arguably undermined the longstanding, but
faltering, CARICOM conceptualisation of regional integration. Similarly, the
process by which it was negotiated did largely ignore civil society (until it was
too late to engage these forces), was unquestionably facilitated by a
convergence of thinking with the EU and did rely heavily on the CRNM
taking the lead in charting the course of the negotiations. All of this can be
admitted, and it constitutes important and valid commentary on the EPA. Yet,
for all their energy and conviction and some of the fair points they make, the
fact remains that the EPA’s many critics were never able to land a knockout
blow on the CRNM and the official position of the CARIFORUM
governments that signed up to the deal negotiated by the CRNM with the
EU. It is very interesting and important to move the analysis to a deeper,
structural level and ask why it was that they never quite succeeded in doing
this.
Ultimately, the reason that the critics could not comprehensively undermine
the CRNM’s case in favour of the EPA was that, by the mid-2000s, there no
longer existed a serious development alternative open to the Caribbean, other
than to seek out the best available niche in the neoliberal global order that had
been built up over the preceding 30 or more years. The key distinction between
the official and the critical view of the EPA can thus be distilled into the
difference between two strategies of response to this reality: an aggressive one
(seek accommodation as soon as possible on the best terms that could be
negotiated) and a defensive one (protect existing hard-won trade and
development advantages for as long as possible). The burden of the early
part of the argument of this paper was to show, first, that the indigenous
Caribbean development debate had run out of steam by the turn of the 21st
century and, second, that the EU’s notion of ‘development cooperation’ had
narrowed in a similar fashion over the same period of time. The harsh fact of
the matter is that the era of Caribbean dependency theory and of the bright
hopes of early Lome´ has long since passed, to be replaced by a limited choice of
options made available to all states and societies under the terms of the
contemporary neoliberal settlement.
The CARIFORUM–EU EPA has been caught up in precisely this shrinking
of policy space and narrowing of development options. This is fundamentally
what has generated the fierce, and highly revealing, debate about the regional
political economy that we have described and analysed here. It can only be
Matthew Louis Bishop et al.
CARIFORUM–European Union economic partnership agreement
23
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
concluded that, for small preference-dependent economies like those in the
English-speaking Caribbean, there is no alternative but to come to terms as
sensibly and as painlessly as possible with the new orthodoxy that trade is the
route to development. As is well known, this has not yet been decisively
confirmed by the signing of a Doha trade deal on this basis, and indeed that
may not occur or need to occur. For, in practice, the US has shifted its focus
to the pursuit of this end by the signing of bilateral agreements (Phillips 2005)
and the EU has come to adopt a uniform approach to the various regions of
the world, thereby de-privileging the historical position in the system of its
former colonies (Hurt 2010). Each has been prepared to exert considerable
policy leverage to bring about their desired ends and in fact to go beyond what
can presently be negotiated within the WTO. The CRNM saw this new, and
rough, world coming into being, and tried to turn it to the Caribbean’s
advantage by means of the tactic of gaining early, and potentially superior,
terms of accommodation. It carried the region’s governments with this
prospectus, but, as we have seen, it did not succeed in persuading Caribbean
civil society or other key regional stakeholders that such a deal was in practice
the only defensible option. The resulting problem is that this failure will make
it harder, and perhaps impossible, for the EPA actually to succeed in delivering
the economic growth that potentially could flow from improved market access
to the EU. The lesson is that the Caribbean desperately needs to embark on
a wide-ranging popular debate about the paucity of development alternatives
facing its peoples in this present stark era of global affairs.
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Notes
1 CARIFORUM was established in 1992 to facilitate cooperation between the largely English-
speaking CARICOM and the Dominican Republic and Haiti, following the accession of the
latter to the Lome´ Convention. Although 13 of the 15 members of CARIFORUM — Antigua
and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago — signed the EPA on 15 October, 2008, Guyana initially refused to sign, only to do so
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5 days later on 20 October. Haiti, which qualifies for EU unilateral trade preferences as a LDC,
has yet to sign.
2 In November 2007, the five countries of the East African Community — Burundi, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda — broke away from the East and Southern Africa ‘region’ and
signed a separate interim agreement with the EU, thus creating a seventh ACP group.
3 Confidential interview with senior Caribbean diplomat, Brussels, January 2009.
4 Confidential interviews with CRNM officials, Brussels and Geneva, January and February
2009.
5 Confidential interviews with CRNM officials, Brussels and Geneva, January and February
2009.
6 Confidential interview with senior WTO official, Geneva, February 2009.
7 Confidential interview with senior Caribbean diplomat, Geneva, February 2009.
8 Confidential interview with CRNM official, Geneva, February 2009.
9 Confidential interview with CRNM official, Geneva, February 2009.
10 Confidential interview with South Centre official, Geneva, February 2009.
11 Confidential interview with Oxfam official, Geneva, February 2009.
12 Some have attributed the readiness of Barbados, in particular, to sign the EPA, to the fact that it
is one of the more ‘developed’ countries of the region and, ergo, this development stems from a
‘forward thinking’ attitude to trade liberalisation and so on. Yet there are, it seems to us, a few
problems with such an account. First, it is not clear that Barbados is ‘more’ developed than
other Caribbean countries; its high levels of GDP per capita come with some very troubling
trade-offs in terms of the inflationary cost of living, particularly of land and staple goods.
Second, it is unlikely that such development, however it might exist, has anything to do with the
early signing of the EPA. Finally, it is notable that, in the recent debates within the region,
Barbados is often singled out as the country that is most reticent to implement both the EPA and
many components of the CSME. Ironically, it is Guyana, the supposed laggard in terms of
signing, which is often cited as one of the best implementers.
13 Confidential interviews with CRNM officials, Brussels and Geneva, January and February
2009.
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